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INTRODUCTION

In an important victory for both women and the cause of human
rights, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has criminalized forced
pregnancy. 1 The Court's Statute defines forced pregnancy as "the
unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the
intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying
out other violations of international law."2 Although the concept of a
forced pregnancy crime is relatively new,3 "'forced impregnation' has
been used throughout history as a tool of assimilation or subjugation of
the enemy, minority, or slave populations." 4 There is some evidence
that the ancient Athenians used it as part of their genocide of the
Melians for example,5 and in more recent times "thousands of outcast

* Associate. Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY; J.D.. Georgetown University Law
Center: M.A., New York University: B.A., Columbia University.
1. See Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human
Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 625, 656 (2001).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. art. 7(2)(f). July 17. 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome statute(e).pdf
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
3. Boon, supra note 1. at 656.
4. Robyn Charli Carpenter. ForcedMaternity: Children's Rights and the Genocide
Convention, 2 J. GENOCIDE RES. 213. 223 (2000) [hereinafter Carpenter, ForcedMaternity].
5. Id. at 223 n.36.
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children were born as a result of the rapes of Bengali women by the
West Pakistani army" in 1971.6
Nevertheless, it was not until the mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda
caught the attention of feminist legal scholars 7 that forced pregnancy
began to capture the public consciousness.8 Estimates vary but victims
of rape gave birth to an estimated 2,000 - 5,000 "children of hate" in
Rwanda and perhaps 400 - 600 in Bosnia. 9 In Bosnia, particularly,
commentators have alleged that Serbs had a systematic plan to
impregnate Croatian and Muslim women and force them to bear
Chetnik (i.e., Serb) babies.1" Catherine MacKinnon railed against a
legal system that made states lack of protection for women
internationally protected."
Against this backdrop, feminist groups united to create the Women's

Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC ("Women's Caucus"). 12 The
Women's Caucus was enormously influential during the planning
phases of the ICC, and over the fierce opposition of some states, was
successful in arguing for the inclusion of forced pregnancy in the ICC
Statute. 3 While the ICC has only just begun hearing cases, the court

6. Id. at 223.
7. Robyn Charli Carpenter, Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape
Discourse, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 428, 431 (2000) [hereinafter Carpenter. Surfacing Children]
("Overnight, it seemed, that plight of Bosnian women had become a domestic issue to American
feminists"); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights,
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994); BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA--ERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (1996): Siobhan Fisher, Occupation ofthe Womb: Forced
Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DuKE L.J. 91 (1996).
8. See generally Carpenter, ForcedMaternity, supra note 4, at 223.
9. Id.
10. Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing. Religious,
Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia. 20 HuM. RTS. Q.
348, 359 (1998); ALLEN, supra note 7, at 61-65. These allegations have seemingly been called
into question because of Bosnia's failure to establish that there was a Serbian policy of forced
pregnancy before the International Court of Justice. See Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia &
Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, at 367 (Feb. 26).
11. MacKinnon, supra note 7. at 12; see also Veronica C. Abreu, Women's Bodies as
Battlefields in the Former Yugoslavia, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1. 11 (2005) ("The current
international legal framework inadequately addresses the realities of... sexual terrorism.").
12. See Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Stepfor Women: Female-FriendlyProvisions
in the Rome Statute for the InternationalCriminalCourt, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 317. 352 (2002);
see also Marlies Glasius, How Activists Shaped the Court, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Dec. 2003.
http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc magazine/icc-glasius.html.
13. See Glasius, supra note 12; see also Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 12, at 352;
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has already gone far beyond any other international
tribunal in
14
recognizing crimes committed against women.
Despite the optimism that surrounds the ICC and its recognition of
forced pregnancy, little attention has been paid to how the crime will be
prosecuted. In this Article, I will examine the potential difficulties
associated with prosecuting forced pregnancy before the ICC. In Part I,
I examine the ambiguities in the definition of forced pregnancy as well
as the mens rea and actus reus of the crime. A particular problem is
that the ICC definition "shall not in anyway be interpreted as affecting
national laws related to pregnancy."1 5 Is it possible to make sense of
"forced pregnancy" without in some sense recognizing a women's
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy? In Part II, I will address
the different contexts in which forced pregnancy can potentially be
prosecuted. Forced pregnancy qualifies as both a crime against
humanity and a war crime under the ICC statute. 6 There are particular
challenges to prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity
and war crime. I will also address the claim that the ICC Statute does
not go far enough - that forced pregnancy is genocide.

I.

WHAT

IS FORCED PREGNANCY?

A. The Elements of Forced Pregnancy

To prove the crime of forced pregnancy, the prosecutor will have to
establish that "[t]he accused confined one or more women forcibly
made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law."17 This holds true whether the perpetrator is tried for forced
pregnancy as a war crime or crime against humanity. 8
Alessandra Stanley, Semantics Stalls Pact Labeling Rape a War Crime, N.Y. TIMES. July 9,
1998, at A3.
14. See, e.g., Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 12, at 353; Boon, supra note 1,at 673; see also
Tina Karkera, The InternationalCriminal Court'sProtectionof Women: The Hands ofJustice
at Work, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 197, 198 (2004).
15. ICC Statute, supra note 2, 7(2)(f).
16. Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii).
17. Report of the Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Finalized Draft Text of
the Elements of Crimes, arts. 8,(2)(b)(xxii)-4, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.1 /Rev.1 /Add.2
(2000),
available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/JNDOC/LTD/NOO/383/70/PDF/
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As the above definition makes clear, the actus reus of the crime of
forced pregnancy is not the rape and impregnation 9 but rather the
unlawful confinement." The perpetrator of forced pregnancy is the
person who confined "one or more women forcibly made pregnant''
not the one who necessarily committed the rape.22 As Kristen Boon
notes, "[t]he legal harm of forced pregnancy is that women are kept
pregnant by means of confinement."23 The confinement must also be
"to a certain location" 24 and the crucial period is between the time a
woman is thought to be pregnant and the termination of the pregnancy.25
To be sure, the prosecutor will have to prove that the woman confined
was also "forcibly made pregnant," but in theory a woman could be
forcibly made pregnant without a resort to violence. 6 Commentators
have speculated that a woman could be forcibly made pregnant through
artificial insemination or other modern technology and that preventing a
woman from using contraceptives could be sufficient action to make a
woman forcibly pregnant under the Statute.2
To prove forced pregnancy it is not sufficient for the prosecutor to
show that a woman forcibly made pregnant has been confined. The ICC
Statute also stipulates that the confinement must be "with the intent of
N0038370.pdf [hereinafter Elements].
18. Id.; see also id. art. 7(1)(g)-4.
19. See Boon. supra note 1. at 660.
20. See ICC Statute. supra note 2, art. 7(2)(f) ("Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful

confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant.").
21.
Elements, supra note 17, arts. 7(1)(g)(4)(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)(4)(1).
22. Some commentators seem confused on this point. See. e.g.. Jonathan M.H. Short,
Sexual Violence as Genocide: The DevelopingLaw ofthe InternationalCriminalTribunalsand
the International Criminal Court, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 503, 512 ("Forced pregnancy is
accomplished by impregnating a woman, whether by rape or other medical means, with the
sperm of a man of a different ethnicity"); see also Carpenter. Surfacing Children, supranote 7,

at 445-49 (2000) (discussing failure of MacKinnon and others to differentiate forced
impregnation from forced pregnancy).
23. Boon, supra note 1, at 660.
24. Elements. supra note 17, art. 8(2)(a)(vii)(2)(1).

25.

Boon, supra note 1. at 662-63.

26. Machteld Boot, Article 7(2)( "ForcedPregnancy" in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 164-65 (Triffterer ed., 1999) (noting that any

form of coercion negates consent).
27. See Boon, supranote 1, at 661 ; ANNE TIERNEY GOLDSTEIN, CTR. FORREPROD. LAW
AND POLICY, RECOGNIZING FORCED IMPREGNATION AS A WAR CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 91 (1993); see also Carmela Buehler, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and
Genocide: The Crime ofForcedPregnancy in the Nascent System of SupranationalCriminal
Law, NEMESIS. Sept.- Oct. 2002, at 158, 163. available at http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/DivTs/
Nemesis/2002/nemesis 2002 crimes.pdf.
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affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other
grave violations of international law., 28 The Croatian government
would not be liable for forced pregnancy, for example, if it prevented a
Croat raped and impregnated by Serbs from securing an abortion
because the government presumably lacked the requisite mens rea. As a
practical matter, the intent requirement places a limit on the identity of
the perpetrators and victims - they must be members or thought to be
members of different ethnic groups. 9
Forced pregnancy can also be prosecuted when the confinement was
committed with the intent to perpetrate other grave violations of
international law.3" This alternate intent requirement broadens the scope
of forced pregnancy considerably because there is no limit on the
ethnicity of perpetrators or victims.3 1 Unfortunately, the ICC Statute
does not explain what it is meant by "grave violations. 32 Presumably
the conduct covered would include confining a forcibly impregnated
woman for the purpose of conducting scientific experiments as the
Nazis did during World War I11" or in order to enslave the mother and/or
child.34 Courts will likely have a great deal of discretion to shape the
mens rea required for forced pregnancy because the ICC Statute does
not impose any definite limitations.
B. Conceptual Problems in the Definition of Forced Pregnancy
The definition of forced pregnancy could be more precise in several
respects. Although it is relatively clear that the actus reus is the
unlawful confinement, it is not as clear whether a woman must be
forcibly made pregnant with the intent of "affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of

28.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii).

29.

Boon, supra note 1, at 663.

30. ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii).
31. Boon, supra note 1. at 665.
32. The Statute does refer to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See ICC
Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(a). There is some evidence that sexual crimes would constitute
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions although this is not explicit in Article 8(2). See
Jocelyn Campanaro, Women, War, and InternationalLaw: The HistoricalTreatment ofGenderBased War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557, 2589 (2001).

33.

See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender

Crimes Under the InternationalCriminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFE. 65, 74 (1999).

34. See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(c). Enslavement encompasses trafficking
under the Statute. Id.
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international law."3 A textual reading suggests that only the
confinement is subject to the heightened requirement because a comma
separates "forcibly made pregnant" from "with the intent of." Thus, the
prosecutor will not have to explore the reasons underlying a rape, for
example.3 6 Nevertheless, the ICC Statute could be clearer on this point.
Another important question is what the prosecutor has to prove with
regards the pregnancy itself. Presumably he/she will have to present
evidence that the pregnancy was not voluntary and was brought about
by rape, for example. The person accused of forced pregnancy could, if
he chose, challenge this, even if he was not the one who impregnated
the victim. To prove forced pregnancy, therefore, it will often be
necessary to prove rape by a party not before the court. Yet, surely
every time someone is accused of forced pregnancy, the prosecution
cannot be expected to hold a full trial for rape as well. Given this, how
much evidence will the prosecution have to present on this point? Will
the judges have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a rape
occurred to convict the perpetrator of forced pregnancy?37 If the rape
can be treated as a mere part of the forced pregnancy proceeding,
however, the alleged rapist's right to be tried in his presence would
appear to be violated.38 He would be denied the opportunity to contest
the claims made against him or put forward the defense of his
choosing.3 9 There may also be implications for the presumption of
innocence if he is later tried.4" Perhaps the ICC will have to try the rape
first and then move on to the forced pregnancy subsequently. The
drafters of the Rome Statute may have assumed that the person who
forcibly impregnated the victim would also be the one on trial for forced
pregnancy although, as I have suggested, this may not always be the
4
case. '
The ICC's forced pregnancy provision also does not specify whether
the alleged perpetrator must know that the woman he is confining was
forcibly made pregnant. Is it enough that he should have known? As a

35. Id. art. 7(2)().
36. Proving political motives in rape cases is notoriously difficult as anyone with
experience in asylum law can attest to. See generallyKrishna R. Patel, Recognizing the Rape of
Bosnian Women as Gender-BasedProsecution,60 BROOK. L. REV. 929 (1994).
37. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 66(3).
38. Id. art. 63(1).
39. See generally id. art. 67.
40. Id. art. 66(1).
41. See also Boot, supra note 26, at 165.
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general matter under the ICC statute, a wrongdoer must have knowledge
of all the material elements of a crime4 2 where knowledge is defined as
"awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events."43 Presumably this means that the perpetrator
of forced pregnancy must be aware that the woman he is confining is
pregnant and also that the impregnation was forcible, whether it
occurred through rape or some other means. Considering that he may
well not have been present during the impregnation, the perpetrator
might credibly argue that he could not know the circumstances of the
pregnancy. The court, after all, has to make its own determination on
whether a woman was forcibly made pregnant, and this determination
involves a mixture of fact and law. The court would presumably
consider legal concepts such as "force" and "consent."44 Would a
suspect have to have made a similar determination to "know" that the
woman was forcibly made pregnant? The ICC views knowledge as
actual awareness, and in forced pregnancy cases prosecutors might be
hard-pressed to demonstrate sufficient awareness.
C. Relation to National Abortion Laws
Perhaps the most puzzling part of the ICC's treatment of forced
pregnancy is that the definition "shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy."45 This language was
added to Article 7.2(f) on the insistence of the Vatican and states
opposed to abortion.4 6 These delegations to the preparatory conference
were concerned that forced pregnancy would be "used to supplant antiabortion laws and endanger Catholic hospitals that refused to provide
abortions."4 This language ensures that the ICC will not recognize a
general right to abortion.

42. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 30.
43. Id. art. 30(3)
44. Buehler, supra note 27, at 163. The ICTY's use of such concepts has not been
without controversy. See generally Adrienne Kalosieh, Consent to Genocide? The ICTY's
Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca. 24 WOMEN'S

RTS. L. REP. 121 (2003).
45. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(f).
46. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute ofthe InternationalCriminalCourt,
93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 22, 31 (1999); see also Boon, supranote 1, at 659; Buehler. supra note 27. at
162.
47.

Boon, supra note 1, at 659.
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If there is no right to obtain an abortion, then how do we make sense
of the forced pregnancy provision in the ICC statute? Rape and
unlawful confinement are already prohibited under the ICC statute.48
Boon argues that that criminalization of forced pregnancy evidences
respect for a woman's bodily integrity and sexual autonomy, 49 but her
argument could just as easily apply in the domestic context to oppose all
regulation of abortion, and yet, the forced pregnancy provision "shall
not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy."5 More convincingly, Carmela Buehler argues that an
unwanted pregnancy greatly exacerbates the pain of the rape.5" She
writes, "[i]f she is forced to bear the child as a consequence of her
confinement, this is a long process during which the child will always
be a reminder of her ordeal."52 Others have speculated that
"[p]regnancy may worsen the long-term of impact of rape on the victim
by eliminating any chance of maintaining acceptance by a husband or
family."53 Perhaps the best way to understand forced pregnancy under
the ICC Statute is that women should be able to terminate "forced"
pregnancies5 4 whereas it is up to individual nation-states to determine if
abortion should be available in other situations.
This alternative formulation is equally problematic. As previously
noted, a woman can be made forcibly pregnant without necessarily
having been sexually assaulted. It seems inadequate, therefore, to
justify the crime of forced pregnancy on the assumption that the crime
occurs pursuant to a rape. Indeed, if Boon is correct, a woman can be
forcibly made pregnant when she is denied access to birth control. 5 If
this is the case, I find it hard to believe that the reason this woman
should be allowed to terminate her pregnancy is because the pregnancy
would represent an ongoing reminder of the harm done to her in

48.

Rape is prohibited as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. See ICC

Statute, supra note 2. arts. 7(1)(g). 8(b)(xxii). Unlawful confinement is a war crime. Id. art.
8(2)(vii).
49.

Boon, supra note 1, at 668.

50.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(f).

51.
52.
53.
54.

Buehler, supra note 27, at 166.
Id.
See Carpenter, Surfacing Children,supra note 7, at 435.
Boon states that this right may already be guaranteed under Article 12 of the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, but this is a
controversial position. See Boon. supra note 1, at 666 & n.189.
55. Id. at 661; see also Buehler, supranote 27, at 163.
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denying her access to contraception. The indignity central to the crime
of forced pregnancy is not being forcibly made pregnant - which will
usually be punishable as rape or some other crime56 - but rather that a
woman is being forced to carry a child against her will. If it were
otherwise, the Statute would criminalize "forced impregnation" not
"forced pregnancy."
Second, and perhaps more important, if the ICC Statute recognized a
woman's fundamental right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy caused
by rape, then the Statute would not have noted that forced pregnancy
"shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating
to pregnancy." 5 There is no guarantee that national abortion laws will
not infringe on a woman's right to terminate a forced pregnancy. This
is hardly surprising as the provision needed to satisfy constituents that
were fervently opposed to abortion in all circumstances. 8 Boon argues
that most national abortion laws already recognize an exception for
forced pregnancies. 9 Even if this is so, however, the ICC Statute seems
to concede that nations have the right to set their own abortion laws, and
this would presumably trump any obligations nations may have had
under earlier treaties or customary international law.6"
The consequence of the forced pregnancy compromise is that the ICC
appears to have created a 'state action' exception in forced pregnancy
cases. If nations are allowed to restrict abortion however they wish,
then they can presumably confine women in order to prevent them from
having abortions. A person confining a woman forcibly made pregnant
pursuant to a national law that prohibited abortion, therefore, would be
immune from prosecution by the ICC. If a private individual were to
affect the confinement, however, he too might be immune from
prosecution depending on whether his conduct would be sanctioned by
the state.6 1 The ICC Statute never explains exactly what constitutes

56. Impregnating someone against their will via artificial insemination, for example.
presumably falls under the Statute's prohibition on using medical science against the interests of
the patient. See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(b)(xi).
57. Id. art. 7(2)().
58. See Arsanjani. supranote 46, at 31: see also Buehler, supra note 27, at 162: Boon,
supra note 1, at 659.
59. See Boon, supra note 1, at 666.
60. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30. May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27. 1980).
61.
If, for example, it permitted the confinement of abortion-seeking woman by their
families.
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"unlawful confinement" in the forced pregnancy context, and given this,
the ICC seems obliged to consider whether suspects have violated their
own nation's abortion laws.
This apparent deference given to national law in forced pregnancy
prosecutions is in stark contrast to how other crimes are prosecuted by
the ICC. As a general matter, the ICC will only apply domestic law as a
last resort and after having examined the ICC Statute and international
materials. 62 A worrying possibility is that the ICC might have to apply
national abortion laws even when they are fundamentally discriminatory
or sexist. While applying such laws is forbidden by Article 2 1(3) of the
ICC Statute, the fact that forced pregnancy "shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy" 63 suggests
that the ICC Statute requires that enormous deference be given to
national abortion laws. Thus if the crime of forced pregnancy occurs on
the territory of a state where abortion is not permitted and the
confinement is not contrary to the laws of that state, it will be
impossible for the ICC to prosecute the forced pregnancy. Conversely,
if the crime is committed on the territory of a state that permits abortion,
the ICC would be able to prosecute the forced pregnancy. This
disparity can only be explained by the fact that the core of forced
pregnancy is that women cannot be prevented from terminating
unwanted pregnancies, but nations who reject abortion appeared to have
carved out an exception for themselves in the Statute.

II.

THE MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCED PREGNANCY

The ICC Statute recognizes forced pregnancy as a crime against
humanity as well as a war crime.64 Many commentators have also
argued that forced pregnancy is genocide65 although the ICC does not
explicitly treat it as such. Forced pregnancy is defined identically in
Article 7 (the ICC's crimes against humanity provision) and Article 8
(the ICC's war crimes provision), but the elements of forced pregnancy
differ depending on the context. There are particular challenges
depending on whether forced pregnancy is prosecuted as a crime against
humanity, war crime, or genocide.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See ICC Statute, supra note 2. art. 21(1).
Id. art. 7(2)(f) (emphasis added).
Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii).
See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 7, at 91; MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 11.
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A. Forced Pregnancy as a Crime Against Humanity
To be convicted of the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy,
the perpetrator's conduct must meet the definition of forced pregnancy
in Article 7(2)(f) as outlined above. In addition, the crime must be part
of a "widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population,"66 and the perpetrator must know that his conduct was part
of or intended to be part of this widespread or systematic attack.67
The ICC Statute defines "attack directed against a civilian
population" as a "course of conduct involving the multiple commission
of acts [such as murder] against any civilian population, pursuant to or
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack., 6' Forced pregnancy then must occur against a backdrop of
violence where murder, rape, and other enumerated crimes69 are
prevalent. Although there need not be a full-blown war, the attack must
be "widespread or systematic" but not necessarily systematic and
widespread.7 ° This is the case for all crimes against humanity.71
While the ICC Statute does not define either "widespread" or
"systematic," the former requirement seems to suggest that an attack
must be of a relatively large scale while systematic refers to the element
of coordinated planning.72 To prosecute forced pregnancy as a crime
against humanity, therefore, not only must the crime occur as part of an
attack, but the attack must be of a large scale or alternatively involve a
high degree of coordination (and the perpetrator must know of the
attack and his role in it). There also appears to be a limit on the identity
of the perpetrator because the attack of which he is a part must be
"pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy."'' 7 This
would rule out "free-lancers" who decide to commit crimes on their
own.

74

66.
67.
68.
69.

Elements. supra note 17, art. 7(1)(g)(4)(2).
Id.
ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
Id. arts. 7(1)(a)-(k). Forced pregnancy is one of the qualifying crimes listed under

7(1)(g).
70.
71.
72.

See id. art. 7(1).
Id.
David Luban. A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity. 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 108

(2004).
73.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).

74.

Luban, supra note 72, at 96.
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Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity is
problematic in a number of respects. The actus reus of forced
pregnancy is unlawful confinement and presumably the confinement
will often occur away from any widespread or systematic attackforced pregnancy is a crime that often occurs in isolation.75 How can
forced pregnancy be part of an attack, however, when the unlawful
confinement will often occur far away from the original attack? 6 While
crimes like murder are often part of attacks on civilian populations,
forced pregnancy is ultimately a crime committed against an individual
woman. It is conceivable, moreover, that in many cases the confiner
would even be aware of the circumstances of the systematic or
widespread attack. This has led some to suggest that the attack
requirement must be loosened for sex-related crimes against humanity
like forced pregnancy.77
The ICC Statute also does not address the issue of whether the
prosecution would have to prove that there was a national policy to
commit force pregnancies. Without such a policy, the perpetrator might
not be acting "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy."7 8 The Statute states that it is the attack itself that must be
"pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy"
whereas the forced pregnancy merely needs to be a part of the attack.7 9
But how can forced pregnancy be part of this attack unless there is at
least implicit state approval of the crime? If history is any guide,
prosecutors might be hard-pressed to find the requisite evidence of state
sanction."0

75. Cf. Brook Sari Moshan, Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in the
Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes Against Humanity. 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 154. 183 (1998) (arguing that rape and other sex-related crimes occur in
isolation and thus might not constitute crimes against humanity under the Statute).
76. What if the unlawful confinement was to occur in Serbia, for example, but the
forced impregnation and rape occurred in Bosnia?
77. See Moshan, supra note 75. at 183.
78. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
79. CompareElements, supranote 17. 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3) with ICC Statute, supranote 2.
art. 7(1)(g).
80. In Bosnia, for example, there were documented incidents of forced pregnancy, but
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and preventing them from terminating their pregnancies. See The Secretary-General. Final
Report of the Commission ofExperts EstablishedPursuantto Security CouncilResolution 780
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B. Forced Pregnancy as a War Crime
The ICC Statute allows forced pregnancy to be prosecuted as a war
crime if the crime occurs in the context of (or is associated with) either
an international conflict8 1 or a non-international conflict.8 2 Forced
pregnancy is one of the war crimes in Article 8 that are "serious
violations of the laws and customs"8 3 of international law but not "grave
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions.84 This does not necessarily mean
that the ICC views forced pregnancy as any less serious than other war
crimes, but rather, under the Geneva Conventions (which form the basis
of modern prosecution of war crimes), rape and other sex crimes are not
acknowledged as "grave breaches."8 5 The perpetrator of forced
pregnancy must be aware of the factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conflict whether the conflict is international
or internal.86
Armed conflict is not precisely defined under the ICC Statute.
However, the Statue makes clear that "armed conflicts" are not
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. 8 7 War
crimes occur only where there is a protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.8 From this, it seems evident that the ICC is precluded from
prosecuting war crimes when there are not two hostile parties. If a
government were to launch an attack on a population that had not taken
up arms, its agents could probably not be charged with war crimes.89
This is regrettable from the perspective ofjustice, but the ICC only has
jurisdiction over persons "for the most serious crimes of international
concern."9 Presumably domestic courts could prosecute war crimes
such as forced pregnancy that occur during internal conflicts, whether

81.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).

82.
83.
84.

Id. art. 8.2(e)(vi).
Id. art. 8(2)(b).
Id. art. 2.

85.
86.

See Buehler. supra note 26, at 164.
Elements, supra note 17, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)(4)(3), 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3).

87. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(f).
88. Id.
89. They could potentially be charged with crimes against humanity if the conditions
set out in the ICC Statute are met because there is no armed conflict requirement.
90. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. I (emphasis added).
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there are two opposing parties or not, but it remains to be seen how
many governments will follow the ICC's lead and criminalize forced
pregnancy.
The elements of forced pregnancy as a war crime are more lax than
those of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity. The perpetrator
need only be aware that an armed conflict exists - he need not know
that there is a "widespread or systematic" attack or his particular role in
the attack. 9' The armed conflict and the crimes committed therein need
not be "in furtherance of a state or organizational policy."92 Moreover,
the forced pregnancy does not have to be committed as a part of the
armed conflict 93 -it merely has to be associated with it. 94 As long as an
armed conflict involves the large-scale or purposeful commission of war
crimes, 9' and the perpetrator of forced pregnancy had some connection
to the conflict, he can be convicted for committing a war crime.
The ICC's treatment of forced pregnancy as a war crime would seem
to still preclude prosecuting free-lancers.
This is potentially
troublesome. If someone takes advantage of the existence of an armed
conflict, where law and order has broken down, he should not be able to
escape punishment simply because his conduct was not strictly
"associated" with the armed conflict.
However, given prior
jurisprudence before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely Prosecutorv. Tadic, the Court is likely to
find that criminal conduct is associated with an armed conflict if the
criminal act is not unrelated to the armed conflict and was not done for
the perpetrator's purely personal motives. 96 Under this precedent, the
ICC will likely be able to reach even perpetrators whose actions were
tangentially connected to armed conflicts. Most prosecutions of forced
pregnancy will consequently be under the ICC's war crimes provision.

91.

CompareElements, supranote 17, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3), with id. art. 7(1)(g)(4)(3).

92.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).

93.
94.

See Elements, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(g)(4)(2).
See id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)(4). 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3).

95.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(1).

96. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment and Opinion,
(May 7, 1997).

634, at 228
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C. Forced Pregnancy as Genocide
The ICC Statute does not explicitly treat forced pregnancy as
genocide. The Statute lists five acts that constitute genocide when
committed with the intent to "destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group," and forced pregnancy is not among
these acts.97 This seems to stand to reason. As one commentator has
put it, "[h]ow is it possible to view the creation of human life as
genocidal?"98 "How precisely is a group destroyed by the creation of
individuals?"99 Moreover, the notion that forced pregnancy is genocide
forces us to ignore several biological realities.' ° When a woman is
forcibly made pregnant with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of a group,10 1 the ethnic composition of the group is not
affected because the child will still in part belong to the mother's group.
Children, after all, receive in equal parts genetic material from mother
and father.
To some advocates, however, genocide can be equated with the
pollution of the bloodline. 1 2 Catherine MacKinnon has stated bluntly:
"Croatian and Muslim women are being raped, and then denied
abortions, to help make a Serbian state by making Serbian babies."'0 3
MacKinnon's argument is that in purportedly patriarchal societies like
Serbia, where the ethnic identity is based on the ethnicity of the father,
forced pregnancy is used to increase the population of one group at the
expense of the other. 1 4 Siobhan Fisher has put the point more
generally: "[w]hen reproduction is used to proliferate members of one
group and simultaneously to prevent the reproduction of members of
another, it is a form of destruction."'0 5 As long as the victim of forced
pregnancy is carrying the child of the enemy, she cannot give birth to
children of her own group, and after she gives birth she may be too

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
U.C. DAVIS
103.
104.
105.

See ICC Statute, supra note 2. art. 6.
Carpenter, ForcedMaternity, supra note 4, at 222.
Id. at 218.
See generally Salzman, supra note 10. at 364-65.
ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii).
See Darren Anne Nebesar, Note, Gender-Based Violence as a Weapon of War, 4
J. INT'L L & POL'Y 147, 154-55 (2000).
MacKinnon, supra note 7. at 13.
See id; see also Salzman, supra note 10, at 365.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 120-21.
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devastated to bear children of her group in the future. 116 What is
important then might not be the genetic reality that the children of
forced pregnancy belong to both groups, but rather the perceptions of
perpetrators and victims.'
This view has some support in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu decision
before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).08 In
dicta, the Tribunal wrote that forced pregnancy can be seen as genocide
when it is intended to prevent births within a group." 9 The ICTR wrote:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the
identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births
within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is
deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have
her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's
110
group.

The ICC, like the ICTR, considers the imposition of measures intended
to prevent births to be genocide."' Forced pregnancy then, if performed
with the requisite intent, could potentially be prosecuted as genocide
under Article 6(d) of the Statute." 2
Although the ICC may choose to read Article 6(d) to allow for the
prosecution of forced pregnancy as genocide, there are strong reasons
that it should not do so. The perpetrator of forced pregnancy is able to
affect the ethnic composition of a particular group only if the group
views the offspring as a product of "the other." Carpenter writes, "[t]o
function as genocide, the children (and the mothers who bore children
"of the enemy") must be seen by the group as alien to the group."' '3 In
other words, to treat forced pregnancy as genocide is to substantiate the
myth that identity is determined solely by the ethnicity of the father; it is
to accept the notion that the mother's ethnicity is erased from the

106. See Buehler, supra note 26, at 165.
107. Salzman, supra note 10. at 365.
108. Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
109. Id. 507.
110. Id.
111. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(d).
112. Buehler also speculates that forced pregnancy can be prosecuted as genocide under
Article 6(b) - where the qualifying action is causing serious bodily or mental harm. See
generally Buehler, supra note 27, at 165. While Buehler is undoubtedly correct that forced
pregnancy causes bodily or mental harm, forced pregnancy is only the destruction of a group in
so far as it is seen by the group as such. See discussion infra.
113.

Carpenter, Surfacing Children,supra note 7, at 444.
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offspring." 4 Such views have real consequences, most notably on the
"children of the enemy," who inevitably end up alienated from both
cultures.' ' The overall treatment of such children is of deep stigma,'' 6
and the women who give birth to them are often isolated from their own
culture and community.1 7 The preamble of the ICC Statute proclaims
that the state parties are "conscious that all peoples are united by
common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage."
Treating forced pregnancy as genocide is to validate the notion that a
child must be ethnically and culturally pure to belong to a particular
people. Paradoxically, those who advocate treating forced pregnancy as
genocide operate from the same framework as those that perpetrate the
crime.
The intent required to commit genocide also appears to be at odds
with the intent required for forced pregnancy. To commit genocide, one
must have the intent to "destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group." " 8 To commit forced pregnancy, however, the
perpetrator must have the intention to affect the ethnic composition of a
population or carry out other violations of international law by means of
unlawful confinement.' '9 The intent required for forced pregnancy is
usually readily inferred from the facts of the confinement. When a
pregnant woman is held until she gives birth to a "child of the enemy"
and then let go, this would seem to suggest that the confinement was for
the purpose of affecting the ethnic composition of her group. The same
facts cannot also give rise to genocide unless having the intent to affect
the ethnic composition of a group also means the perpetrator always has
the intent to "destroy in whole or in part." Such an interpretation,
however, would turn every war crime and crime against humanity of
forced pregnancy into genocide. The framers of the ICC could not have
intended such a result.
Moreover, the requisite intent to destroy in whole or in part is
unlikely to be found from the facts of a forced pregnancy. If one group

114.
115.

See id at 443.
See generally Carpenter, ForcedMaternity, supra note 4, at 228-32.

116. Id. at 228. Carpenter goes on to write with regards the children born in Bosnia:
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117. See Buehler, supra note 27, at 165; see also Nebesar, supra note 102, at 155 ("The

woman's scar is not just her own, yet she alone is shunned for having it.").
118.
119.

ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
See id. arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii).

MichiganState JournalofInternationalLaw

[Vol. 16:439

wishes to destroy another, forced pregnancy would probably not be the
weapon of choice. According to one account from a rape camp, women
who were to bear "Chetnik babies" were segregated from the rest,
received extra food and other privileges, and were examined by
gynecologists.12 ° Forced pregnancy is a horrible crime, but it is hard to
read these facts as proof of genocide. Presumably a group intent on
genocide would not confine women of the enemy group and let them go
- they would kill them. MacKinnon has speculated that the idea of
forced pregnancy is to create a "fifth column" in the enemy population,
but the children of forced pregnancy can assimilate and are just as likely
to be victims of murder and genocide as anyone else.' 2 ' As Carpenter
has argued, "[iut seems conceptually meaningless to rely on the
imagination of perpetrators to label a child's ethnicity when in fact the
child's life experience and identity may be embedded in a different
community."' 22 While the ICC is not precluded from treating forced
pregnancy as genocide, there are legal and practical considerations that
justify the ICC Statute's position in not explicitly treating it as such.
The Rome Statute is correct to view forced pregnancy as a war crime
and crime against humanity and not genocide.
CONCLUSION

International courts are increasingly concerned with crimes
committed against women such as forced pregnancy and forced
marriage.123 At the same time, the ICC and other institutions 124 have no
120.

Salzman, supra note 10, at 359.

121.

Carpenter, ForcedMaternity, supra note 4, at 232.

122.
123.

Id.
For a discussion of "forced marriage" before the Special Court of Sierra Leone. see

generally Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-ConflictJusticefor
Sierra Leone's Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 100-02 (2005). Forced marriages

arguably qualify as "other inhumane acts" under the Crimes Against Humanity Provisions ofthe
Special Court's Statute and have been charged as such. See id. at 102; see also Press Release,

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Arraignment of
RUF and AFRC Indictees on Charges Related to Forced Marriage (May 17, 2004), availableat

http://www.sc-sl.org/prosecutor-051704.html.
124. A Trial Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone recently acquitted several
defendants of the charge of forced marriage on the grounds that the crime is subsumed by the
crime of sexual slavery, labeling the forced marriage charge as redundant. See Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 713-14 (June 20. 2007). The ICC may

likewise choose to treat forced pregnancy charges as subsumed by charges of rape and unlawful
confinement but given that the Statute specifically prohibits forced pregnancy, this would be
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body of law upon which to draw in considering these crimes. Although
it is a welcome development that the rights of women are no longer of
secondary concern to international law, we cannot be sure how courts
will treat these crimes. The ICC will have substantial discretion in
analyzing forced pregnancy because the work of the ad hoc tribunals
and domestic jurisprudence is of limited use in dealing with a crime that
has only recently been recognized.
In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate some of the potential
flaws in the ICC's treatment of forced pregnancy. In Part I, I focused
on ambiguities in the definition, particularly with regards the actus reus
and mens rea of the crime. Forced pregnancy is not actually one crime,
but two: There must both be a forcible impregnation and an unlawful
confinement. The perpetrator of forced pregnancy is the one who
commits the latter crime. However, since one cannot be convicted of
forced pregnancy without the impregnation occurring, the prosecution
will also have to prove that the former crime occurred. This is
potentially worrisome since the rights of third-parties may be implicated
in the proceeding, and it is unclear how much knowledge the perpetrator
of forced pregnancy must have as to the origins of the pregnancy. We
also have every reason to question whether the Statute's deference to
national abortion laws is appropriate given that the criminalization of
forced pregnancy protects a woman's right to not be pregnant against
her will.
In Part II of this paper, I emphasized the difficulties posed in
prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity and war
crime. Given the special nature of forced pregnancy, it will be hard to
prove that the crime was committed as part of a "widespread or
systematic" attack. The perpetrator who confines the victim may have a
credible argument that he is unaware of the particulars of any attack, let
alone that his action was pursuant to any organizational policy. Indeed,
treating forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity moves the
inquiry away from the harm done to an individual woman to an inquiry
into an individual's complicity in a larger unlawful scheme.
Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a war crime is not as problematic since
the perpetrator need not be furthering some governmental policy - his
conduct simply needs to be loosely associated with an armed conflict.
problematic. During the drafting process, many delegates believed that there was a sufficient
basis through rape and unlawful confinement provisions to prosecute forced pregnancy.
Buehler, supra note 27, at 162.
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We can expect to see most prosecutions of forced pregnancy to be under
the war crimes provisions of the ICC Statute.
Lastly, I argued that while forced pregnancy can potentially be read
as genocide under Article 6(d) of the ICC Statute (i.e., as a measure
intended to prevent births in another group), the ICC should be reluctant
to treat forced pregnancy as genocide. Forced pregnancy contributes to
the destruction of a group only to the extent that we accept the notion
that children must belong to one group or another. While forced
pregnancy is a horrible crime, the action of detaining a woman so she
can be forced to give birth does not rise to the level of genocide, and
courts will be unlikely to infer genocidal intent from the facts of a
forced pregnancy. Forced pregnancy inflicts very real pain on
individual women, but it is only genocide to the extent courts wish to
endorse the flawed patriarchal assumptions of the attacking population.
In criminalizing forced pregnancy, the ICC is sending a clear
message to the world that women cannot be treated as mere "vessel[s]
of reproduction." 2' 5 At the same time, many challenges await the court
as it begins to prosecute forced pregnancy. The ICC must strike a
delicate balance between vindicating victims and respecting the rights
of suspects accused of this new crime.

125.

See Carpenter, Surfacing Children,supra note 7, at 443.

